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IMPORTANT LATE DECISIONS
EVIDENcE--DYINo DFCLARATIOx-EFFECT OF RELIGIOUS
BELIEF UPON COMPETENCY OF WITNESS.
Defendant having been convicted of murder, upon ap-
peal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of
Marshall v. State, the question was presented whether
the fact that the deceased was an infidel would disqualify
her as a witness and would therefore prevent the use of
her dying declaration in evidence. The court, in a valu-
able historical discussion of the rules relating to the com-
petency of witnesses, cites Coke's definition of an infidel
as comprising only Jews and heathens, and holds that
the fact that one was an infidel would not at common
law disqualify him as a witness. The court states the
common law rule as follows: that the witness should be-
lieve merely in the existence of an Omnipotent Supreme
Being as the rewarder of truth and the avenger of false-
hood. In the absence of evidence that the witness did not
believe in such a Supreme Being, the mere fact of in-
fidelity was held not to disqualify. Marshall v. State, 121
Southern Reporter 72.
WILIS AND ADMINISTRATION-ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION
-POWER TO APPOINT OVER THE ESTATE OF A NON RESI-
DENT-EFFECT OF DECISION OF FOREIGN PROBATE COURT.
Rnrico Caruso, the well known operatic star, made a
contract with the Victor Talking Machine Company, a
New Jersey Corporation, whereby the Company agreed
to pay a royalty of 10% on all sales of the Caruso sing-
ing records for an indefinite period of time.
Caruso was a native of Italy, born in Naples and died
there in August, 1921. He was at all times a citizen of
Italy, and that was his domicile at the time of his death.
He left him surviving his wife, Dorothy Park Benjamin
Caruso, and a daughter Gloria, also two illegitimate sons
born and resident in Italy. These illegitimates had been
acknowledged by Caruso as his offspring, but on account
of the laws of Italy they were not entitled to inheritance
because their mother was at the time of their birth mar-
ried to another man.
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Caruso executed a holographic will by which he be-
queathed his entire estate to the said illegitimate children
and to his brother as his universal heirs, bequeathing to
his wife that portion of his estate which, under the
Italian law, she would have been entitled to receive by
reason of her marriage; the will also provided for sup-
port of his stepmother until her death.
Mrs. Caruso and daughter were residents of the United
States and have continually resided here since the death
of the husband. An ancillary administrator was ap-
pointed by the New Jersey Court to take over and dis-
tribute the royalties to be paid by the Victor Talking
Machine Company and a partial ad interhn decree of dis-
tribution was made.
Under the Italian law, the birth of Gloria rendered the
will made by Caruso, a nullity, and by virtue of the pro-
visions of the Civil Code, a family council was consti-
tuted. A family agreement was reached and entered into
by all parties in interest except Mrs. Caruso, and this
agreement was submitted for approval to the Naples
Tribunal which provided, among other things, for the dis-
tribution of the royalties to be paid by the Victor Talk-
ing Machine Company. It was decreed by the Court of
Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, in the case of Caruso
v. Caruso, 148 Atl. Rep., page 882, that the Naples
Tribunal, being the Court of the decedent's domicile, had
full power to make distribution of all of the decedent's
estate, including that which had its situs in the United
States, and that its decision was final and bound all of
the heirs of the estate, and under the facts as above
stated. The New Jersey Probate Court had no power to
appoint an ancillary administrator to make any distribu-
tion of assets nor did it have power to make distribution
of moneys received by it in the State of New Jersey. It
was also held that the New Jersey Court had no power to
appoint a special guardian for the daughter Gloria nor
to authorize the payment of any money to her, and the
decrees of the lower court were reversed and the pro-
ceedings ordered dismissed.
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AGENCY-ATTORNEY-AGNCY COUPLED WITH INTEREST-
DEATH OF PRINCIPAL.
Appellee railroad Company of Canada issued several
hundred shares of its stock to a German corporation.
The war broke out and these shares were declared to be
vested in the Canadian alien property custodian. The
actual shares had gone to Germany. By the Treaty of
Versailles, England retained and liquidated all alien
property within the Dominions. The shares were de-
clared forfeit to the government of Canada. Germany
acted to sequester such outstanding shares, but they
were smuggled into the United States where one Braun
bought them up and entered into an agreement with
Lewis, an Illinois attorney, by which Lewis agreed to
collect on the shares for a 50% fee. Braun then died.
His widow refused to be a party of the proceedings.
Lewis instituted suit against the railway company.
Lewis insists that he may sue in his own name.
Held, that it is quite apparent that appellant is not
claiming this right by virtue of being executor, adminis-
trator, guardian, or a party with whom, or in whose
name, a contract has been made for the benefit of an-
other. He must, therefore, qualify either as a real party
in interest, as a trustee of an express trust, or as a party
expressly authorized by statute. Whatever interest ap-
pellant has is derived from the two agreements entered
into. The first agreement merely authorizes Lewis to
act as Braun's attorney and representative in the matter
of the shares of stock belonging to Braun. To accom-
plish these purposes Braun authorizes Lewis to take any
steps and any course in Braun's name, and to make any
demands in his name, which in Lewis's judgment is best.
The second agreement states the matter of fees and pay-
ment for services. Mrs. Braun merely signed an 0. K.
thereto. This language is certainly not sufficient to cre-
ate a present interest in Lewis in the stock or dividends.
He was to get no part of the stock in his name, for, ac-
cording to the agreement, it was all to be transferred,
and certificates issued, to Braun; likewise, the agreement
gave him no present interest in the dividends, for it ex-
plicitly states that they are to be collected for Braun.
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There is a vast difference between a mere agency and an
agency coupled with an interest. Likewise, there is a
great difference in interests with which the agency may
be coupled. It is very clear that appellant, by virtue of
the agreement, falls into the class of agency which is an
agency with bare power, and may be revoked at will, and
is always revoked by the death of the principal. Appel-
lant, in fact, was nothing more than a custodian of the
certificates at any time. Appellant had no right to main-
tain this action in his own name, or jointly with Mary A.
Braun, or with her as administratrix of the estate of her
deceased husband. Lewis v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co.
ano. U. S. C. C. A. 7th Cir. (Ill.) Decided March 29,
1930.
BAILMENT-STORAGE OF FURNITURE-LIABILITY FOR Loss.
Plaintiff owned a valuable bedroom set and stored it
with defendant storage company. It was stipulated that
the set should be packed and crated to protect it from
damage. Defendant failed to crate the set until sixty
days after the storage period had begun. It then sent the
set out to be crated, and the crating plant burned at that
time, destroying the set.
Held, that in the very nature of things it was not con-
templated that the wrapping and crating should be done
some sixty days after the furniture was delivered, and
within some ten days of the time when it was called for,
for that would have defeated, or largely defeated, the
very purpose of having the furniture wrapped and crated.
In these circumstances, defendant removed the furniture
from the place agreed upon for its storage at a time
when it had no authority whatever to do so, and thereby
actively violated its contract. The law is that the ware-
houseman must comply with the contract of storage. If
he has contracted to store goods in a specified warehouse,
or in a particular place, and stores them in a different
place, it is at his own risk, and he is liable for any in-
jury which occurs, even without his own negligence. De-
fendant issued to plaintiff an itemized receipt, which con-
tains the following: "Our responsibility for any one
piece or package is limited to the sum of fifty dollars."
Plaintiff's attention was not called to this provision in
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the receipt. Since the contract was complete when this
receipt was delivered, and since plaintiff's attention was
not called to the clause, it cannot be considered that she
consented to such a change in her contract, and is not
bound by the clause. Williams v. Gallagher Transfer &
Storage Co., Ltd. Supreme Ct. La. Decided March 31,
1930.
RIGHTS IN LAND--EASEMENTS.
A deed containing no recitals as to particular ease-
ments etc. but referring to plat or subdivision wherein
such are shown, makes such particulars as much a part
of the deed as if they had been recited therein. The ease-
ment of an alley acquired thus is by grant, and to con-
stitute an abandonment of such easement there must be
in addition to nonuser circumstances showing intention
of dominant owner to abandon use of the easement.
In order that the owner of the servient estate may ac-,
quire title to the portion of the alley adjoining his prop-
erty by adverse possession for the statutory period, clear
positive and unequivocal evidence must be introduced.
Adverse possession must continue for the full statutory
period of twenty years, and if such continuity of adverse
possession is broken before statutory period has elapsed,
benefit of previous adverse possession is lost and adverse
complainant must commeneb possession de novo.. Defendants whose adverse possession of alley had con-
tinued for a long time but was interrupted by use of alley
by other adjacent property owner, did not acquire title to
alley by adverse possession.
Mere delay of owner of dominant estate in asserting
right does not bar enforcement of right in equity unless
statutory period of twenty years has elapsed, but in ad-
dition to delay there must be something in conduct of
complainant making it inequitable for him to assert title.
Obstruction of alley complained of occuring in the fall
and a bill to enjoin obstruction filed in following spring
will not be considered as laches for failure of complain-
ant to start suit at an earlier date. Yunkes et al v. Webb
et al. 170 N. E. 709. Supreme Court of Illinois, April 4,
1930.
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RIGHTS IN LAND--BUILDING LINE REsTRwCTIONS.
A building line restriction long acquiesced in except
for slight violations does not necessarily operate as
abandonment of it altogether where material -and bene-
ficial part remains. A complainant is not precluded by
her own slight violation of the restriction from maintain-
ing a suit enjoining defendant from erecting a building
on a lot adjoining plaintiff's lot, which erection would be
a substantial violation of the restriction.
Failure of complainant to protest violations of the re-
striction on other streets which could not be seen from
her property does not preclude right to protest and en-
join a violation which seriously affects her property.
Claim of acquiescence as barring a property owner
from enjoining the violation of restrictions by others
should be measured in its force by the relation of the
asserted violation to the individual property of the com-
plainant.
The rule that equity will refuse to intervene in plain-
tiff's behalf, where the character and environment of
property has so changed as to make it unfit or unprofit-
able for use if the restriction be enforced, does not apply
where the character and condition of the property on the
street or in the neighborhood has not changed even
though such changes have taken place in other portions
of the subdivision. O'Neill v. Wolf, 170 N. E. 669. Su-
preme Court of Illinois. April 2, 1930.
FEDERAL EQuITY RULEs-MuLTIFARIOUSNESS AND DIsTINC-
TION BETwE.N JOINT AND SFVERAL ACIOnNs.
The bill alleged that complainant leased one of several
stores owned by the lessor to be occupied as a men's
haberdashery, with the written agreement that no other
of said stores should be leased for said purpose to any
other tenant; that thereafter the lessor did lease another
of said stores for said purpose to a competitor of com-
plainant. The bill joined as defendants the lessor and
the competing tenant, praying against the former that
the permission to compete be enjoined, and against the
latter, that the continuance of said competing be en-
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joined. Defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds,
one of which is misjoinder. The Chancellor held, that
although "mere multifariousness is no longer an objec-
tion to a bill," under modern Federal Equity Rules "a
joint action can be supported only on the basis of a joint
liability;" that, "the distinctions between joint and sev-
eral actions are just as clearly preserved;" that, "a
plaintiff with a several right of action in himself and a
joint right of action held by him and another could not
join the two in one bill, nor could a defendant, who was
severally liable, be joined with another defendant who
was likewise severally liable, as if they two were jointly
liable;" also that the liability of the defendants in the
present case was several and that the joinder was, there-
fore, improper. Leave was given to amend the bill in
this and other respects. Benjamin et al. v. Stanley Co.
of America et al. 37 (2nd) Fed. Rep. 904.
MORTGAGES-EFFECT OF REDEMPTION.
The decision of the Appellate Court in the case of
Hack v. Snow, 252 Ill. App. 51, caused considerable ex-
citement and even anxiety among members of the bar,
as an affirmance by the Supreme Court would have un-
settled the law in this state as to the effect of a redemp-
tion by the mortgagor, or by his grantee, upon the rights
of junior lienors.
The facts of the case are not complicated. A judgment
creditor, whose lien was junior to that of a mortgage
which was being foreclosed, failed to bid at the fore-
closure sale, although he had appeared in the proceed-
ings and had made proof of his judgment. The mort-
gagee bid in the property for the amount of the mort-
gage indebtedness, the master issued to him a certificate
of sale, and within one year parties who had acquired
the equity of redemption subsequent to the sale redeemed
by making payment to the master. Thereafter the judg-
ment creditor caused an execution to be issued and levied
on the property, and the same was about to be sold to
satisfy the execution, when the complainant filed her
bill to enjoin the sale.
The Superior and Appellate courts decided in favor of
the plaintiff, but the Supreme Court held that the sale
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under the foreclosure did not change the character of
the estate which the owner of the right of redemption
has in the land. The certificate of sale was rendered null
and void by the redemption and the premises were there-
by freed of the lien of the mortgage, the only lien of
which payment had been ordered by the decree. The lien
of the judgment creditor was still effective and he was
entitled to have the property sold in satisfaction there-
of. His lien could only have been extinguished by the
issuance of a Master's deed pursuant to the certificate
of sale, after the expiration of the period of redemption.
Hack v. Snow, 338 Ill. 28.
EQUITY PLEADING-EFFECT OF LATE FILING OF DEFENSIVE
PLEADING WITHOUT LEAVE.
Defendant in error filed her bill in chancery to set
aside a bailiff's sale of real estate on execution and to
quiet title to certain real estate as against plaintiff in
error who was purchaser at bailiff's sale. Summons was
returnable on the third Monday in April, being April
15th. An answer was filed by the defendant, plaintiff in
error, on the next day, no extension of time to plead hav-
ing been requested. The following June 3rd, an order of
default was entered against him and on July 31st, a final
decree pro confesso against him. Plaintiff in error as-
signed as error the entering of said order and decree
while his answer was on file. The court held that in
affirming the decree that "the general rule is when the
time for pleading has expired and the party has filed a
pleading without leave of court and without consent of
the adverse party, filing thereof is an irregularity, which,
if not waived, renders the pleading liable, at the discre-
tion of the court, to be stricken on motion, or disregarded,
or treated as a nullity." The court cited: Farmer v.
Fowler, 288 Ill. 494, 123 N. E. 550; Walter Cabinet Co. v.
out further leave the defensive pleading in question was
Russell, 250 Ill. 416, 95 N. E. 462; Flanders v. Whittaker,
13 Ill. 707. Farmer v. Fowler, supra, is also a chancery
case. Here the time for pleading is extended, but after
the expiration of the-period of such extension and with-
out further leave the defensive pleading in question was
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filed. The court held that it was properly treated as a
nullity by the complainant and the chancellor. Balulis
v. Hooper, 338 Ill. 21, 169 N. E. 821.
RIGHTS IN LAND--COVENANTS.
A deed, conveying one of two adjoining lots owned by
the grantor, contained a covenant that no dwelling house
should be erected on the lot not conveyed unless so built
that the best rooms of the house should face or front on
the lot conveyed. The title to both lots having become
merged in a single owne , it was held that the merger of
title rendered ineffective the previous restrict covenant.
Spector v. Traster, 70 N. E. 567.
RIGHTS IN LAND-UNDBIRGROUND WATERS.
The owner of a farm, on which was a spring, which
for many years had furnished an abundant supply of
water for domestic purposes, brought action for damages
for the stoppage of the flow of water in the spring by
reason of the sinking of a well on a farm at a point one-
half mile distance from the spring. Held that all under-
ground waters are presumed to be percolating, and to
overcome the presumption the existence of a defined sub-
terranean stream must be shown as known or readily
ascertainable. One who claims rights in a flowing stream
has the burden of showing its existence. Logan Gas Co.
v. Glasgo, 170 N. E. 874.
RIGHTS IN LAND--EMINENT DOMAIN.
This was an action for damages to a farm resulting
from the building of an electric transmission line. Held
that the jury improperly took into consideration merely
speculative damages, or remotely contingent damages
such as the unsightliness of towers, the possibility that
wires may fall and cause damage, the possible injury
from fire or lightning, injury to crops from falling
towers, or damages resulting from teams or tractors
colliding with the towers. In fixing damages to land
taken under the power of eminent domain, the damage to
land not taken in condemnation proceeding is the depre-
ciation in the market value. Such damage must be direct
and proximate, and not such as may be conceived by the
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imagination merely, or affects the owner's feelings.
Illinois Power & Light Corporation v. Barnett et al.
170 N. E. 717.
NEGLIGENCE-AUTOMOBILE DRIVBR'S NEGLIGENCE NOT IM-
PUTED TO PASSENGER.
W. H. Bailey, with three others, as invited guests of
the defendant driver, while riding over the Lincoln High-
way from the city of Mansfield to an amusement park
about four miles distant, was injured by an overturn of
the car. When near the park, on the crest of an incline,
the left rear tire blew out, and the driver fearing a col-
lision with a car parked a short distance ahead, gave his
car a short turn to the right causing the rear to swing
in a short arc and upsetting the car. The defendant was
driving at 40 to 50 miles an hour, of which plaintiff had
made no complaint. Plaintiff charges defendant with
negligence by reason of excessive speed and improper
handling of the car after the blowout. Defendant claims
that the accident was solely the result of the blowout,
that plaintiff did not object to the speed of the car, and
was a licensee, and assumed the risk, and especially that
the parties were engaged in a joint enterprise, and that,
if the defendant was negligent, such was imputed to the
plaintiff, and hence there could be no recovery.
The court restated that the doctrine of imputed negli-
gence does not ordinarily apply in Ohio, recognizing the
exception to the rule in case of joint enterprise. The de-
fendant assumes that the exception to the rule is herein
applicable in that the parties were all members of the
same orchestra, riding in the same car to the place where
it was to furnish music, and that plaintiff attempted to
exercise control over the car's operation after the tire-
burst, by his exclamation, "Hold her in the road." The
court says that before the rule of imputed negligence can
be invoked, it must be shown that the parties are engaged
in a joint enterprise, and that they are jointly operating
or controlling the movements of the car in which they
are riding, with a right of mutual control; that the evi-
dence here shows no such right or exercise of control
over the car's operation by plaintiff. The fact of mutual
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interest of the occupants in the purpose of their trip,
cannot alone create joint enterprise, as understood in
law. In considering the case, the court recognizes a fur-
ther restriction upon the rule, which precludes the de-
fendant from his claim, in that the exception to the rule
does not apply and may not be invoked in an action by
one member of the enterprise against another, for the
reason that one cannot invoke his own negligence to de-
feat his associate's claim for injuries due to such negli-
gence, as such would also be the permitting of one to
take advantage of his own wrong. The court recognized
the general rule as stated in 1 Berry on Automobiles
(6th ed.) page 692, that "a person invited to ride in an
automobile is a licensee, and the duty of the person ex-
tending such invitation is to use ordinary care not to in-
crease the danger of the guest or to create a new danger.
* * * The guest or passenger may assume that the
driver will obey the law, and that he will not voluntarily
and improperly increase the common risks of travel by
automobile."
Defendant's reliance upon the fact of the tire-burst as
an efficient intervening cause, was thus disposed of by
the court: "However, it is the law that, where an injury
is the combined result of the negligence of the defendant
and an accident, for which neithe.r the plaintiff nor the
defendant is responsible, the defendant is liable unless
the injury would have happened if he had not been neg-
ligent. In other words, if the negligence of the defend-
ant was the efficient and proximate cause of the injury,
and the plaintiff in no way contributed thereto, then the
defendant is liable. And the question of proximate cause
and efficient intervening cause is likewise for the jury
and not the court. See Thompson on Negligence, vol. 1,
page 68. * * * It is surely a good law. that, if the in-
jury resulting from the wrongful act could have been
foreseen by a prudent person, the perpetrator will be held
accountable therefor; for, when once a chain of events
has been started, due to the negligence of the operation
of an automobile, the one in control may be held respon-
sible for all possible mishaps which are properly the
proximate result of the unlawful act." Bailer v. Parker
et al. 170 N. E. 607 (Ohio).
